There have been differences among most presidents’ advisers ever since. Thomas Jefferson was accused of relying on an “invisible, inscrutable” group of associates that engaged In backstairs influence.
　　Franklin Roosevelt managed to be a pretty good resident, though even his idolatrous supporters concede that he took his advice from inside and outside the White House and even took a mischievous delight in playing one staff or cabinet member against another.
　　Ike followed the military staff system. He did not spend hours listening to the disputes of his principal aides, but gave Sherman Adams and later General Bedell Smith authority and responsibility for settling differences. When his chief of staff could not settle differences, he insisted on a one-page memorandum defining the problem, no matter how complicated, and then made his decision.
　　Harry Truman did not believe in the single chief of staff. He had six principal advisers with whom he met every morning. At the end of the day, he would have a little bourbon and branch-water with one of them in the Oval Office, then would take a bundle of papers upstairs, put on his green eyeshade and read reports until late in the night.
　　John F. Kennedy followed much the same system with his brother Robert, Larry O’Brlen, Kenny O’Donnell and Ted Sorensen at his side, though their assignments were not limited as rigidly as those of the Truman advisers. Lyndon Johnson did not invite criticism or differences which his staff or cabinet, but bullied his advisers into compliance, which helps explain his troubles in Vietnam.
　　Richard Nixon ran his staff by stealth. He did his homework and mastered the details of policy, but he delegated vast powers to Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in an atmosphere of Byzantine secrecy and intrigue.
　　Jimmy Carter had his troubles between his White House staff and his cabinet, particularly over the conduct of foreign policy. But his White House staff wa